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Dillingham: Constitutional Law: Old Glory Sits Down
CASE COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: OLD GLORY SITS DOWN
Smith v. Goguen, 94 S. Ct. 1242 (1974)

After two encounters with policemenl Valerie Goguen was charged with
violating the Massachusetts flag desecration statute that prohibits mutilation,
2
trampling, defacing, or "contemptuous treatment" of the United States flag.
Although Goguen's sole offense consisted of displaying a small flag on the seat
of his trousers, the trial jury returned a guilty verdict, 3 and the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed. 4 Upon Goguen's application for a
writ of habeas corpus, a federal district court found the statute unconstitu-

tional, 5 and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed.6 On certiorari,
the Supreme Court concurred with the lower federal court decisions and
HELD, the "treats contemptuously" language of the statute was completely
devoid of a "readily ascertainable standard of guilt," rendering that part of
7
the statute void for vagueness.
Following the rowdy presidential election campaign of 1896,8 a number of
state legislatures passed the precursors of today's flag desecration statutes.9
Although these enactments represented an immediate response to physical
abuses of the flag,' 0 their underlying rationale hinged upon an attempt to

1. 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1244-45 (1974).
2. MAss. GN. LAws ANN. ch. 264, §5 (1971). The relevant text reads: "Whoever publicly mutilates, tramples upon, defaces or treats contemptuously the flag of the United States
...whether such flag is public or private property . .. shall be punished by a fine of not
less than ten nor more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one
year, or both." Cf. FLA. STAT. §§256.05-.06, 779.21 (1973).
3. 94 S. Ct. at 1246.
4. Commonwealth v. Goguen,
Mass.
,279 N.E.2d 666 (1972).
5. Goguen v. Smith, 343 F. Supp. 161 (D. Mass. 1972).
6. Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1972).
7. 94 S. Ct. at 1244-52.
8. "During the campaign, paper flags bearing pictures of the political candidates were
posted in courtrooms in Anderson, Indiana. They were torn down and trampled. In Council
Bluffs, Iowa, a large American flag with a partisan banner was fired upon with a shotgun. A
soldier returned the fire, killing the assailant's horse. At Sedalia, Missouri, a child with a
flag in her hand was singing campaign songs on the platform of a special train. A man seized
the girl's flag and burned it, to the applause of some members of the crowd.
"In Hammond, Indiana, a large flag bearing a partisan motto was suspended across the
city's principal street. It was pulled down early one morning and trampled in the mud. A
flag was 'rottenegged and torn' at the railway station in Jamesville, Wisconsin, by contending political groups; and a flag in Waukesha, Wisconsin, was ripped from its staff at a street
comer and torn to shreds."
Prosser, Desecration of the American Flag, 3 IND. L.F. 159, 196-97 (1969); see 9B UNIFORM
LAws ANN. 48 (Commissioner's Prefatory Note).
9. The early statutes were extremely broad in scope as a result of the lengthy listing of
abuses by the American Flag Association. 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 48. See also Halter v.
Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 39 n.1 (1907); Prosser, supra note 9, at 194-97; Rosenblatt, Flag
DesecrationStatutes: History and Analysis, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 193, 196-97.
10. 9B UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 48; see Prosser, supra note 9, at 197.
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prevent political and commercial interests from exploiting the incorporeal or
symbolic nature of the flag.11 Thus, in Halter v. Nebraska12 the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of a beer distributor who had offered
for sale bottles of beer with a label incorporating the American flag. In so
doing, the Court reversed a state court trend toward invalidating flag misuse
statutes, 13 finding important state interests in regulating flag conduct in (1)
maintaining the public peace1 4 and (2) fostering patriotism. 5
Gradually, however, the use and purpose of flag desecration statutes began
to change with the involvement of American troops abroad and the corresponding rise in patriotic fervor. 6 Dissidents and suspected enemy sympathizers, rather than commercial interests, became the targets of prosecution
during both the First'7 and Second World Wars.' In contrast, within a few
years after the conclusion of both wars no cases were reported. 19 Then, with
the escalation of the highly controversial Vietnam War and a dramatic increase in arrests for flag desecration 20 courts were called upon to consider the
constitutionality of flag statutes with increasing frequency. 21

11. Rosenblatt, supra note 9, at 200-06; Note, Flag Desecration- The Unsettled Issue, 46
NoTRE DAME LAW. 201, 202-03 (1970). See, e.g., Halter v. State, 24 Neb. 757 105 N.W. 298

(1905).
12. 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
13. The statutes of Illinois and New York had fallen to substantive due process attacks.
Ruhstrat v. People, 185 I1. 133, 57 N.E. 41 (1900); People ex rel. McPike v. Van De Carr,
178 N.Y. 425, 70 N.E. 965 (1904).
14. 205 U.S. at 41: "No American, nor any foreign born person who enjoys the privileges
of American citizenship, ever looks upon it without taking pride in the fact that he lives
under this free Government. Hence, it has often occurred that insults to a flag have been
the cause of war, and indignities put upon it, in the presence of those who revere it, have
often been resented and sometimes punished on the spot." See generally Prosser, supra note
8, at 159-96.
15. 205 U.S. at 42: "When, by its legislation, the State encourages a feeling of patriotism
towards the Nation, it necessarily encourages a like feeling toward the State. One who loves
the Union will love the State in which he resides, and love both of the common country and
of the State will diminish in proportion as respect for the flag is weakened." See also Prosser,
supra note 8, at 222-27; Rosenblatt, supa note 9, at 208-09.
16. Prosser, supra note 8, at 159-96; Rosenblatt, supra note 9, at 205-06; Note, Flag
Burning, Flag Waving, and the Law, 4 VAL. U.L. REv. 345 (1970).
17. State v. Shumaker, 103 Kan. 741, 175 P. 978 (1918); Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145
(D. Mont. 1920). Starr was convicted and sentenced to a term of 10 to 20 years at hard labor
for the following speech: "What is this thing anyway? Nothing but a piece of cotton with a
little paint on it and some other marks in the corner there. I will not kiss that thing. It
might be covered with microbes." For examples of permitted curtailing of speech in wartime, see Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 975, 980-84 (1968).
18. Johnson v. State, 204 Ark. 476, 163 S.W.2d 153 (1942); State v. Peacock, 138 Me. 339,
25 A.2d 491 (1942); State v. Schleuter, 127 N.J.L. 496, 23 A.2d 249 (Sup. Ct. 1941); See
Emerson, supra note 17, at 984-86.
19. Rosenblatt, supra note 9, at 207-08.
20. See Note, supra note 16, at 358-60. Over three-quarters of the litigation has occurred since 1966. Rosenblatt, supra note 9, at 193.
21. Some examples of conduct leading to prosecution follow: Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576 (1969); Sutherland v. DeWulf, 323 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Ill. 1971); Crosson v. Silver,
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In the highly charged atmosphere of political demonstrations, particularly
those questioning an unpopular foreign war, acts of flag misuse have led to
pretextual, or at least arbitrary, arrests.

22

Although previously willing to

acquiesce in discretionary arrests for flag misuse,23 some courts have recently
overturned convictions by recognizing the constitutional protection of an individual's symbolic speech from the application of vague and overbroad
statutes. 24 Thus, litigants have increasingly asserted their rights under the
interrelated theories of vagueness, overbreadth, and symbolic speech.25
Fundamental concepts of due process require that statutes give "fair notice
and warning" of those activities that are prohibited.26 Because the average
citizen does not read the statute book before acting, however, the Court's
emphasis has shifted to a second, more pragmatic requirement: that the statute
provide guidance for police, prosecutors, judges, and juries.27 Although the
vagueness doctrine is used to elicit specificity from the law, courts have realized
that because language is inherently ductile the doctrine must be a balance be28
tween clarity and common sense.

319 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Ariz. 1970); United States v. Ferguson, 802 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal.
1960) (burning the flag). Joyce v. United States, 259 A.2d 363 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969) (tearing
the flag). Hinton v. State, 223 Ga. 174, 154 S.E.2d 246 (1967) (lowering the flag). Hoffman v.
United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Cowgill v. California, 274 Cal. App. 2d 923, 78
Cal. Rptr. 853 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 371 (1970) (wearing the flag). Radich v.
New York, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 257 N.E.2d 30, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, aff'd by an equally divided court,
401 U.S. 531 (1970) (using flag in political art). Long Island Vietnam Moratorium Comm. v.
Cahn, 437 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1970), aff'g on other grounds 322 F. Supp. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(placing peace symbol over the flag).
22. "Thus, for example, a Long Island housewife was arrested and held on $500 bail for
flying her American flag upside down to protest the war in Vietnam, while a nearby American Legion post flew its American flag upside down with impunity to protest government
inaction regarding the Pueblo incident. NEwSDAY, Feb. 5, 1968, at 15.
"As counsel admitted a war protestor who, while attending a rally at which it begins to
rain, evidences his disrespect for the American flag by contemptuously covering himself with
it in order to avoid getting wet, would be prosecuted under the Massachusetts statute. Yet a
member of the American Legion who, caught in the same rainstorm while returning from
an 'America-Love It or Leave It' rally, similarly uses the flag, but does so regrettably and
without a contemptuous attitude, would not be prosecuted." 94 S.Ct. at 1248, quoting the
lower court decision, 471 F.2d at 102.
23. Note, supra note 16, at 350.
24. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 445 F.2d 226 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Parker v. Morgan,
322 F. Supp. 585 (W.D.N.C. 1971); Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (Del. 1970); City
of Miami v. Wolfenberger, 265 So. 2d 732 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
25. See, e.g., 94 S.Ct. at 1242; Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1970); Cowgill v.
California, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).
26. 94 S.Ct. at 1247; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 220 (1875).
27. 94 S.Ct. at 1247; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-70 (1972); United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
28. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rrv.
67, 69-71 (1960). See cases cited note 24 supra and Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377
(1913). See also Dickerson, Statutory lnterprefation:Gore Meaning and Marginal Uncertainty,
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The vagueness doctrine concerns the logical sequence of the criteria
whereby one activity is labelled "criminal," hence proscribed, and another is
left unaffected. 29 When applied to the area of protected freedoms the clarity
of the criteria must meet a strict scrutiny standard. 30 The standard is rigorous
so that citizens are not deterred by uncertainty from exercising their constitutional priveleges. 31
Closely related to the question of vagueness in a statute touching protected
freedoms is the doctrine of overbreadth. 32 A law is overbroad if in proscribing
one activity it reaches, either "on its face" or "as applied," another activity
that is constitutionally protected.3 3 Clearly, in the area of first amendment
freedoms, the question of vagueness is concurrently a question of over34
breadth.
When the doctrine of overbreadth is applied to flag desecration statutes, a
threshold question arises concerning the applicability of the first amendment
protection of the challenged activity. 35 Where the activity consists of "pure"
speech (or verbal expression), it is clear that the first amendment applies36
Thus, in Street v. New York 7 the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of
a black man who had both burned and insulted the flag after the shooting of
James Meredith. Because the statute under which Street was charged proscribed words and acts casting contempt upon the flag,38 the Court found the
statute overbroad. 39 If the challenged activity is other than "pure" speech,

29 Mo. L. Rav. 1 (1964).
29. Note, supra note 28, at 76.
30. 94 S. Ct. at 1247; Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948).
31. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 853-58
(1970). The effect, deterring the free exercise of constitutionally protected rights, is commonly known as the "chilling effect."
32. Id. at 873. "When the Supreme Court has spoken of the facial vagueness of statutes
touching first amendment rights, it has seldom if ever been referring to a constitutional vice
different from the latent vagueness of an overbroad law. The vagueness doctrine, that is,
has been almost wholly merged with the overbreadth doctrine when statutes covering first
amendment activities are at issue." Id.
33. Id. at 844. See, e.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 94 S. Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).
34. See, e.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 94 S. Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 US.
518 (1972); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
35. Note, Freedom of Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Crime of Flag Desecration, 12
ARiz. L. REv. 71, 77 (1970).
36. Id. at 73-75.
37. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
38. N.Y. PENAL LAWS §1425(16)(d) (McKinney 1944). This statute was superseded by N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW §136(d) (McKinney 1968).
39. 394 U.S. at 594-95. Justice Harlan's opinion carefully distinguished the act of burning
the flag from the act of denouncing the flag. Because the New York courts failed to make this
distinction, Harlan reasoned that Street may have been convicted solely on the grounds of
his verbal denunciation. As the statute could not constitutionally prohibit all words that cast
contempt upon the flag and as the words of Street fell within the protected category of
political speech, then the conviction must have been unconstitutional. Id.
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however, it may or may not be protected by the first amendment."
In United States v. O'Brien, 1 which involved the burning of a draft card,
the Court enunciated a four-part test to determine the limits of the first
42
amendment protection as applied to expressive conduct, stating:
We think it clear that a governmental regulation is sufficiently
justified (1) if it is within the constitutional power of the government;
(2) if it furthers an imporant or substantial governmental interest; (3)
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
Of these four tests subsequent cases have focused on two major considerations: (1) the nature of the governmental interest 4 and (2) the extent of the
suppresion of free expression.4 4 Application of the O'Brien test to flag desecration cases, however, is still uncertain. 45 As the dissenters noted, the Street decision left unanswered the question of first amendment protection for flag
burning, which symbolically expressed an opinion.- Although the Supreme
Court has subsequently heard several flag misuse cases raising the issue of
symbolic speech,4 7 it has yet to issue a definitive ruling.
In line with recent appeals the instant case presented the Court with the
dual questions of vagueness and overbreadth as to defendant's activities. 4s The
majority declined to discuss the merits of the overbreadth matter, but affirmed
the lower federal courts' contention that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague.4 9 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, argued that "treats contemptuously" is too indefinite to meet the fair notice requirement. 5° Moreover, the
lack of a "readily ascertainable standard" reinforced the Court's concern for
clear guidelines for law enforcement officials, as "arbitrary and erratic arrests
and convictions" result when a statute is vague. 51
In a significant addition to the standards for analysis of the vagueness
question, the majority opinion recognized the effect of changing societal mores
on due process requirements. 52 As activities close to a proscribed zone become

40. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S.
359 (1931). See generally Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1091 (1968).
41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
42. Id. at 377.
43. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
44. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
45. Compare Hodsdon v. Buckson, 310 F. Supp. 528 (D. Del. 1970), with United States v.
Ferguson, 302 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1969).

46. 394 US. at 594.
47. Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971); Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371 (1970).

48. 94 S.Ct. at 1242.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1244.
1250.
1247-48.
1247-48, 1251.
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popular, the statute must more clearly delineate criminal from noncriminal
behavior.53 The effect of this requirement is to put the previously mentioned
clarity-common sense dichotomy into a more easily defined context.5" Thus,
when a greater number of persons become involved in conduct of questionable
legality, the possibility increases that the police may discriminate against a
selected person or group in their enforcement of a vague law.55 By requiring a
greater degree of statutory precision, the Court provided law enforcement officials with more rigid guidelines. 56
Although many state statutes contain similar or identical wording, the direct impact of the instant case is minimal. The Court noted that the vagueness
issue is a complex question that requires the consideration of many factors,
5
including previous prosecutorial patterns and prior judicial interpretations. 7
As these factors may differ from state to state, the Court limited the effect of
its holding to the Massachusetts statute. 58
By avoiding the issues of symbolic speech and first amendment overbreadth
and deciding the case on vagueness grounds, the Supreme Court gave substantial credence to a commentator's assertion that a secondary function of the
vagueness doctrine is the avoidance of institutional conflict.5 9 "The concept
of indefiniteness and its appurtenant doctrines have been developed and used
by the Court precisely to obviate - perhaps only temporarily but hopefully
permanently - the need for narrowly drawn decisions of ultimate power."60
Accordingly, the decision warned state legislatures of the difficulties of drafting
61
a valid flag desecration statute.
In contrast to the majority's avoidance of the first amendment questions,
Justices White and Rhenquist felt compelled to meet the issue head-on be62
cause of their rejection of the vagueness challenge on common sense grounds.
Although Goguen's appeal did not mention any particular idea that the act of
wearing the flag on his trousers was meant to convey, the Justices were firmly
convinced that to cast contempt the act must be expressive. 63 Thus, they applied the O'Brien standards to the flag desecration statute.64 Both opinions

53. Id. at 1248.
54. The specificity required of a statute should be greater when the activity proscribed
is one that many people may come close to doing. "It would certainly be dangerous if the
legislatures could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders." United States v.
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875). See Note, supra note 28, at 74.
55. For example, if two individuals commit murder, an infrequent occurrence, they will
most likely receive similar treatment from the police. If a thousand people are observed to
run a stop sign, however, the personal predilections of the policeman will influence the enforcement pattern.
56. 94 S. Ct. at 1251.
57. Note, supra note 28.
58. 94 S. Ct. at 1251.
59. Note, supra note 28, at 78.
60. Id. at 115.
61. 94 S.Ct. at 1251.
62. Id. at 1253, 1256.
63. Id. at 1254-55, 1257.
64. Id. at 1253, 1260.
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found the requisite authority and substantial state interest, but disagreed
whether the statute primarily limited the conduct or the speech. 65 Concurring in the decision, Justice White saw the element of "contemptuous
treatment" 66 going toward the expressive content of the conduct. Justice
Rhenquist found the interpretation of the statute and of the contempt section
sufficiently narrowed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and dissented from the judgment.67
Even though Justices White and Rhenquist applied the symbolic speech
test to the flag misuse statute, they failed to analyze correctly the fundamental question of substantial governmental interest. The mere assertion that
a Justice has "no doubt"68 or that he "believes"6 9 that a substantial governmental interest exists, does not replace sound legal analysis as the foundation
of a decision. Although property, sovereignty, and patriotism were suggested
as governmental interests, it is significant that neither Justice was able to
enumerate any particular governmental interest in the instant case.70
Commencing with Halter only two important or substantial interests have
been consistently asserted: maintaining the public peace and fostering
patriotism.71 The underlying logic of breach of peace arguments contemplates
that certain acts, as well as certain words, will prompt a violent, unlawful
response by the average citizen. The state, therefore, may exercise its police
power to prevent those acts, even though expressive, if they would elicit an
72
illegal or dangerous response.
In a continuing line of cases the Supreme Court has limited the acceptance
of breach of peace logic to a very narrow factual situation. 73 As Justice Douglas
wrote: "[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
65. Id. at 1254, 1260.
66. Id. at 1254. "In the case before us, as has been noted, the jury must have found
that Goguen not only wore the flag on the seat of his pants but also that the act -and
hence Goguen himself-was contemptuous of the flag. To convict on this basis is to convict not to protect the physical integrity or to protect against acts interfering with the
proper use of the flag, but to punish for communicating ideas about the flag unacceptable
to the controlling majority in the legislature." Id.
67. Id. at 1256, 1262.
68. Id. at 1253.
69. Id. at 1260.
70. The opinions of both Justices mention many possible interests. Yet, the opinions
never reach a conclusion as to which interest is substantial and important. Justice White
seems to place the substantial interest in the area of sovereign power and patriotism. On
the other hand, Justice Rhenquist's opinion flows from public control of private property to
a special governmental proprietary interest to a George M. Cohan conclusion in an attempt
to find the elusive substantial governmental interest.
71. 205 U.S. at 41-42 (1907). See also notes 14-15 supra.
72. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.

568 (1942).
73. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); People v. Von Rosen, 13 InI. 2d 68, 147 N.E.2d

327 (1958).
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stirs people to anger."7 4 The Court has protected symbolic speech with similar
arguments. 5 Finally, the majority opinion in Street explicitly held that the
defendant's words did not fall into the highly inflammatory category; thus his
conviction could not be sustained.7 The clear import of this line of cases suggests that breach of the peace will rarely be used as a substantial government
77
interest justifying restriction of freedom of expression.
More difficult to determine is the specific rationale behind the state's interest in fostering patriotism.75 In West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette7 9 governmental compulsion of uniform patriotic expression, saluting
the flag, was found to violate the first amendment. While Barnette settled the
question of whether a state has the right to compel patriotic activities, the
holding left unanswered the matter of the state's interest in prohibiting unpatriotic activity8s Furthermore, the validity of patriotism as a substantial
governmental interest was denied by the Supreme Court in Street.8 1 Acknowledging the force of Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette,8 2 the Court
stated that speech, which is defiant or contemptuous of the flag, is protected by
8 3
the first amendment.
Since Street involved "pure" speech and the instant case involved only
symbolic speech, the argument is easily made that these are two distinct types
of communications, each protected by different standards.84 The relationship
between "pure" speech and symbolic speech, which concerned the Court, is
based upon the first amendment's emphasis on the expression of ideas.8 5 Thus,
if a symbolic act is communicative and passes the O'Brien test, the first amendment protects that activity as fully as it protects spoken words conveying the
same idea.so

74. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
76. 394 U.S. at 592.
77. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 94 St. Ct. 970 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518 (1972).
78. See generally note 15 supra.
79. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
80. Note, supra note 35, at 85.
81. 394 U.S. at 593.
82. 319 U.S. at 641-42. "The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the
limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism
will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free
minds ....
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to differ as to
things that touch the heart of the existing order." Id.
83. 394 U.S. at 593-94.
84. Smith v. Goguen, 94 S. Ct. 1242, 1256 (1974) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). See generally Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 596 (1969) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
85. See note 40 supra.
86. Note, supra note 40, at 1105-09.
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The O'Brien test suggests the outer limits of protected symbolic speech,
87
but fails to relate how one decides whether conduct is symbolic speech. Perhaps the Court's own words provide a succinct analysis: "Symbolism is a
primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or
flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut
from mind to mind."' s Since the flag is a symbol with intense communicative
potential, it would appear that any act involving the flag may likely be symbolic communication.8 9 Therefore, Valerie Goguen's act was a form of sym-

bolic speech, and in the absence of any "important or substantial governmental interest 90 that speech was entitled to full first amendment protection.
The instant case thus provides the legal community with guidance in the

areas of vagueness, overbreadth, and symbolic speech. The doctrine of vagueness has been defined with sufficient flexibility to meet the vicissitudes of
modem society. Unfortunately, the Court has chosen to avoid delineating the

limits of the first amendment regarding flag desecration statutes and so, as in
the past, constitutional uncertainties in the area of statutory flag etiquette will
invite discretionary application of the law to future political dissidents who
assert Old Glory's symbolic impact. 91
WILLIAM

87.

0.

DILLINGHAM

See note 35 supra.

88. West Virginia State Bd.of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632-33 (1943).
89.

"The medium is the message." H. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTEN-

SIONS OF MAN 7 (1964). See Note, supra note 40, at 1108-09.
90. 391 U.S. at 377.
91. In a decision handed down subsequently to the instant case the Supreme Court accepted an "as-applied" argument that the Washington State flag misuse action violated the
first amendment. The Court could find no valid state interest in the statute's application to
a college student who covered his flag with tape in the form of the peace symbol. Spence v.
Washington, 94 S.Ct. 2727 (1974).
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